Professor Stephen Mayson published his Legal Services Regulation Interim Report today. He deals with in-house lawyers in Section 5.8 on page 70. The section is notable for its implicit commentary on the current context in which in-house counsel operate as it is for its specific proposals and questions regarding changes in regulations.
In the second paragraph he states:
“Analysis of the legal services market shows that a significant and increasing volume of lawyers (about 20%) and legal services are now in in-house settings. There is little doubt that a tension is inherent in this relationship when the client for legal services is also the adviser’s employer, and the usual notion of ‘independent’ legal advice is often stretched.”
This paragraph raises several questions in the mind of, say, a curious Martian were they to land on Earth today and read the report:
- If there is “little doubt that a tension is inherent in this relationship” why has this tension not been addressed before now?
- If the “usual notion of ‘independent’ legal advice is often stretched, why has this “stretching ” not been investigated more frequently heretofore?
- Since the “little doubt” of which he writes is supported by ample anecdotal and written evidence of which most interested parties are aware, not least the UCL Moral Compass Survey 2016 which detailed the extent to which in-house counsel experience ethical pressure, why have boards of directors not done anything about it?
He goes on to say:
“Equally, those advisers who are professionally qualified would typically prefer to maintain their professional independence, ethics and standards and not bow to any organisational or commercial pressures to modify their advice to make it more palatable to their internal clients. In these circumstances, it is arguable that those with professional obligations might benefit from further regulatory support (see also the discussion of ‘inverse vulnerability’ in paragraph Version: IR Final2 71 4.5.3). This could strengthen their position when dealing with internal clients, and provide an independent benchmark or standard against which to justify their professional advice. In principle, they should not be at risk of dismissal or disadvantage simply for observing their professional obligations.”
The Martian might, therefore, reasonably ask:
- Are in-house lawyers currently at risk of dismissal or disadvantage simply for observing their professional obligations, yes or no?
- If no, what’s the problem?
- If yes, why have they not by now received “further regulatory support”?
Professor Mayson moves on to governance:
“Further, effective corporate governance should ensure that in-house lawyers are able to function effectively and are supported in doing so. This might entail express conditions in their employment contract, and a direct reporting line to the Board (or to the chairman or a senior independent non-executive director).”
He references in the footnotes a paper for discussion about best practice: “In-house lawyers and non-executive directors” by Professor Richard Moorhead and others.
The Martian, equipped as they are with instant access to all data on the subject, might ask:
- Why do their current contracts not include “conditions”, given the acknowledged “vulnerability”?
- Since currently, in-house lawyer’s client is already “the board” why has no-one challenged the widespread practice of GCs reporting to CEOs and even CFOs who have unlimited power over their salaries, titles, and performance reviews?
- And in respect of the latter and in reference to “independence” above why are they allowed to take advantage of LTIPs and Bonus schemes?
It is the final paragraph in 5.8.1 that is most shocking and might take our learned Martian by surprise:
“These are not simply private or commercial matters. As we have seen recently, corporate failures can lead to consumer and societal detriment, and in-house lawyers have to be able to sound alarm bells without the chilling effect of potential reprisal. The public interest in effective and fearless legal representation is engaged in much the same way as it is with private practice.”
The Martian might be forgiven for asking in respect of recent corporate failures:
- Did some in-house lawyers not “sound alarm bells” because of “the chilling effect of potential reprisals”? And in what instances? Do we know?
- Did some in-house lawyers sound the alarm bells and in fact experienced the chilling effect of reprisals? And in what cases? Do we know?
- Since “the public interest in effective and fearless legal representation is engaged in much the same way as it is with private practice” why in respect of recent corporate failures was the public interest not protected?
The report goes on to examine the merits of separate registration and other remedies.
However, I would encourage boards, GCs, regulators, Larry Fink and the 181 signatories of The Business Roundtable and anyone else interested in ESG to pause at the end of Section 5.8.1 and ask the question that the Martian might, again reasonably, ask:
- While we may need to wait for a final report to propose new regulations, it’s clear that the public interest remains manifestly unprotected today; surely that can’t wait? What are boards, GCs and the profession/regulator going to do about it?
Whatever changes in regulation are agreed in future, boards would be wise to confront this issue now, before the tumbrils roll.
There is simmering anger in some quarters in the profession because none of the above is news to them. If they came come together, tomorrow, and had each other’s backs in a manner which defies their litigation training, and demanded immediate behaviour change by Boards, under the current regulations, a good start would be made on this problem.
Boards who are relying on lawyers’ propensity to be adversarial with each other are unwise. Their anger is likely to break cover. This report may see to that. Few CEOs and boards are even aware of the problem. That’s about to change.